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OPTIHAL GROWTH AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND CAPITAL
Milind H. Lele and James L. McCabe
Introduction*
Policy makers, some argue, should not be concerned with the fact that
income distribution becomes more uneven during the early stages of development.
For one thing, there is the view that changing income distribution may be a
consequence of the norma.l change in output composition during this period [13].
Rising per-capita product is generally accompanied by a rising share of non
agricultural output.

If the non.,agricultural sector is associated with an

income distribution which is less even than th~t in agriculture, the change
in sectoral weighting will cause the distribution of aggregate income to
become more dispersed.

In a.ddition, it has been argued that in order for an

economy to grow rapidly, income must become more unevenly distributed
over time.

Several economists have stressed the importance of an uneven

distribution of income which favors entrepreneurs [10] nnd [14].

They

contend that such a distribution, which is associated with industrialization,
facilitates the mobilization of savings et low levels of per-capita product.
At an opposite pole to this ,dew is the conte:1.tion that government
policies designed to re-distri~ute income early in the development process
may increase both et:1ployment and output gro•vth.

The main point is that

just as the distribution cf incc!:le is &ffect8d by the composition of output,
income distribution also influerace.s the bill of goods which is demanded.

*We would like to tha::k Professor Kenneth J, Arrow and Moises Syrquin
for invaluable comments and criticism"
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As income becomes more evenly distributed, it is suggested that the demand
for labor-intensive goods rises relative to demand for capital intensive
goods.

Moreover, this hypothesis has some empirical support which is

brought out in Cline's study of two Latin American countries [7].

Thus,

since economic systems are generally characterized by a surplus of labor in
their early stages of development, policies which distribute income more
evenly may increase aggregate output--as a consequence of their effect on
factor opportunity cost.
According to this line of argument, other effects associated with a
more even distribution of income would more than offset whatever dampening
effect a lower level of private savj_ngs due to less inequality may have
on growth.

The level of total savings may be preserved by higher tax

revenues and increased public savings.

A more even distribution of income

would cause the demand for imports to be reduced at a given level of per-capita
income; therefore, it would reduce the impact of one of the main constraints
on growth.

Finally, the changes in output composition stemming from decreased

income dispersion would reduce the aggregate capital-output ratio and the level
of saving necessary to achieve a given growth ratec 1
A third view of income distribution emphasizes that growth and equity
may be conflicting objectives and that the choice of an approriate mix is an
integral part of the problem of social welfare maximizationo 2
1

Berry describes

Most of these ideas are expressed in [11, pp. 139-155].

2

Berry points out that the possibility of a conflict between production
maximization and distribution improvement rests upon the assumption that
fiscal redistribution is relatively costlyc In Berry's words, " ••• it is not pos
sible to maximize production~ forgetting about the distribution implicit in
the particular way in which production is generated, and then redistribute
income as seems appropriate after the fact of the production process"[4, p. 5].
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this situation as follows:
The relation between the two variables can be expressed in a
'possibilities curve,' where quantity of distribution is somehow
measured on one axis and output growth on another; if the two are
in conflic•t the 'possibilities curve' will have a negative slope.
Since we may assume that a community indifference curve between the
two would also have a negative slope, a tangency would, as in a
regular indifference curve-production possibilities curve diagram,
indicate the social optimum [4, p. 5].
The purpose of our paper is three-fold:

(1) to isolate conditions

under which any particular one of the three views just described may be
consistent with an optimal income distribution path over time; (2) to
demonstrate that a model which allows for the social costs of adjustment to
reduced levels of private saving may have more than one turnpike; and (3) to
show the sensitivity of the short-run and long-run grmvth paths to the
weight given to dispersion in the welfare function.
We restrict ourselves to trading off only two effects of reduced
income dispersion, those involving factor opportunity cost and savings.
The others described above have not be;n adequately supported empirically.

1

The problem consists of maximizing an integral of instantaneous welfare
subject to two dynamic equations and initial and terminal conditions on the
capital-labor ratio and the distribution of capital.
1

The problem is designed

Cline [7] shows that in the two Latin American countries examined,
Brazil and Mexico, the impact of improvements in income distribution on the
demand for imports is negligible. On the other hand, in these two countries
income equalization to the degree of equity of England produces a change in
the composition of demand such that food and textiles make up a considerably
larger share of total consumption. Given the high share of unprocessed
food, these sectors are presumed to be relatively labor intensive, although
Cline provides no conclnsive evidence linking equalization to an increase in
the aggregate employment capital ratio. Cline also demonstrates that in
some countries the household savings rate is positively correlated with
income.
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to provide insight into optimal trajectory of the standard deviation of the
distribttion of capital (including land, physical, and human capital).
Once this trajectory has been determined, along with that of the income tax
schedule and the capital labor ratio, inferences may be drawn about changes
in the standard deviation of the distribution of real income.
In Section I, the model is described in detail.

In Section II, the

first-order conditions are derived and the turnpike properties of the system
outlined.

I.

The last section gives the policy implications of the results.

The Model
Denote consumption per laborer of the jth household by cj, capital per

laborer by kj, and non-capital income per laborer by wj.

Then the function

determining the consumption-labor ratio of the jth household may be written as

(1.1)
a

> 0

0-

0

<

-

a

<

1-

1

This function is consistent with a number of theories of consumption
behavior.

If it is assumed that the ratio of real cash balances to capital

assets remains constant, then the relationship is similar to one proposed
by Tobin (17) which makes consumption proportional to real wealth.

If, on

the other hand, individual households save in order to maintain a fixed ratio of
capital assets to normal income, then, given no adjustment lag, a

may be
1
interpreted as the product of the reciprocal of this ratio and the marginal
propensity to consume out of normal income.
Non-capital income is untaxed and allocated completely to consumption
expenditure.

Since only the wages of unskilled labor are included in

wj,

this assumption of a unitary marginal propensity to consume may not be unrealistic.
By subtracting consumption per laborer from total household income per
laborer, we obtain the function
(1.2)

sj

= yjD +

wj - cj

= -a0 + YjD

- a kj

1

where sj is savings per laborer of the jth household and Yii is disposable
capital income per laborer of the jth household.

Denote aggregate

domestic savings per laborer bys, disposable capital income per laborer
by yD' and capital intensity by k,

Then taking the expected value of (1.2)

yields the aggregate savings function

(1.3)

s

=

-a

0 + y D - a 1k

For the sake of simplicity, net foreign capital inflow (which may be easily
incorporated with the constant term a )is set equal to zero and the relationship
0

(1.4)

i = s

where i is gross investment per laborer, is assumed to hold as an identity.
The production-demand relationshiR·

Central to the model is a relationship

giving gross domestic product per laborer as a function of the capital-labor
ratio and the standard deviation of the distribution of capital.

As Fisher [9]

has shown, it is impossible to derive an aggregete production function when
combining sectors which involve different commodities.

Under certain condi

tions, however, functions relating total capital stock and employment to
the factor-price ratio and gross output in each sector may be derived
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by minimizing the cost functions of individual firms.
These functions make up what has been referred to as a "minimum requirements"
isoquant and the basis for the production-demand relationship in our model.
The function determining final demand per laborer in sector t

1

(z )
1

may be written as
(1.5)

where c

k

C

k

,

C

w

,

g, cr, P)

is consumption per laborer financed out of capital income, c

w

is

consumption per laborer financed out of the wages of unskilled labor,
cr is the standard deviation of the distribution of kj, and Pis the vector of
_.commodity shadow prices.

This function combines several relationships,

each of which corresponds to a component of final demand.

To begin with,

investment and government consumption demands by sector are assumed to be
functions of total investment and total government consumption respectively.
Private consumption demand for a commodity produced in sector tis broken

w and ck , representing the different forms of
1
1
These components are determined by the functions

down into two components, c
consumption finance.
(1.6)

(1. 7)

cw=
51,

C

k
-1

e

1

(cw, P)
-

k

= µ n (c , cr' P)
J<.,

where ¢w =wand ck= a + a k.
1
0
111

The wages of unskilled labor are equated

Minimum requirements" functions have been derived by Syrquin [16]
in the case of a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function. We assume that
a linear input-output framework is applicable, which implies that the ratio
of real value added to gross output remains constant in each sector. Consequently,
the sector gross output vector may be included in the "minimum requirements"
functions even though raw materials do not appear explicitly as a factor
of production.

-7to the total consumpti on of this group.

Since these payments are assumed to

have a perfectly even distribut ion among household s, no parameter of income
1 2 Exports net of imports in each sector are func
dispersio n enters (1.6). '
tionally related to the shadow price of the commodity produced in the sector
and the shadow price of foreign exchange.

The latter variable is determine d

by requiring that the balance of payments identity be met (i.e., that the sum
of the sectoral net exports equal zero).
Factor prices, the GDP-labor ratio and the employment rate enter (1.5}
This may be demonstra ted by examining the expressio ns for~, g,

implicitl y.
and!•

Values for~ and g are given by the identitie s

(1.8)

w=

(1.9)

g = y - Yn -

w• e

w

where w is the wage rate of unskilled labor, e is the employment rate and
y is the GDP-labor ratio.

The equation determini ng the vector of commodity shadow prices may be
We assume that the form of the sectoral

derived in the following manner:

productio n functions is such that the value-add ed-gross output ratio in
sector 1 (v ), may be expressed as a function of the two factor prices

3

1

(1.10)

v

1

= h

t

(w,

r)

where r is the rental return on capital.
1
One specific form of these functions may be derived as a simple
extension of the consumpti on demand functions presented by Chenery and Raduchel (6],

2
A more general assumptio n would be that the standard deviation of these
pfyments is constant and that this distribut ion is independe nt of that of the
k'. This in no way affects the final results.
¾alue added, acompiled by summing factor payments, may vary as
a proportio n of gross output, whereas real value added may not. Because of

-7aFootnote #3 fE~~ 7 cont.
the separability assumption implicit in the sectoral production functions,
real value added may be set equal to the difference between gross output and
intermediate inputsa See [15]. Factor payments are deflated by the GDP
price index (pGDP) and the ratio of value added (V) to real value added
(ViR) in sector i is given by the identity v1 /ViR = Piv/PGDP where P1V
is the value added price index for commodity i.
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The shadow price of commodity i is equal to the direct and indirect unit
costs of producing commodity t expressed in terms of the given set of factor prices.
Thus,
(1.11)

P = a P +

--

V

where an element amt of the matrix a represents the amount of the mth
commodity required to produce one unit of gross output in sector i and v
is the vector of vts.
(1.12)

Re-arranging this expression, we obtain
P =

(!. -

a)

-1

_y = (.!, - a)

-1

h(w, r)

where his the vector-valued function determining -:f...•

By substituting (1.8), (1.9), and (1.12) into (1.5), we obtain
(1.13)
a linear transformation of these functions yields
(1.14)

where xis the vector of sectoral gross outputs and~ is the vector of
sectoral final demands. The "minimum requirements" functions may be-written
as

w

(1.15)

k = g (-

x)

(1.16)

e = '¥ (w

x)

r' -

r' -
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Substi tution of (1.14) into these functio ns yields
(1.17)

k = g * (w, r, k, e, o, y, yD)

(1.18)

e =

'¥ *

(w, r, k, e, o, y, yD)

These functio ns are simpli fied in two ways.

First, the labor supply

functio n is assumed to take the fonn

(1.19)

e=e(w ).
e

w

>

e

o

WW

< o

Given that this functio n is monoto ne, we may write
(1.20)

w= e

-1

(e).

This functio n is bounded in the followi ng way
i w

~

w

+

Limit e

-+

Limit e

+ o

00

w

where w is a politic ally determ ined minimum wage.

Since the sum of factor payments equals real GDP
(1.21)

r = (y - w • e) /k

argume nts
By substit uting this relatio nship into (1.17) and (1.18), the number of
upon which k and e depend may be reduced signifi cantly .
The second way in which the functio ns determ ining k and e are simpli fied
gross
is by assuming that variati ons in the ratio of government consum ption to
h
investm ent (with the sum of i and g constan t) do not affect k and e althoug
they do affect output compos ition.

The Yn variab le enters equatio ns (1.17)

and
and (1.18) only through its effect on government consum ption per labore r
gross investm ent per labore r.

Now suppose that even though z R, depend s on g

and i separat ely., K and e depend only upon the sum of g and i.

Then the partia l

deriva tives of (1. 17) and (1. 18) with respec t to y 0 will be zero, since
(1. 22)

'

C

-10The assumption that, cet. par., e and k are insensitive to variations in

Yn is tenable.

It may be argued that factor proportions in the sector producing

capital goods are quite similar to those in the sector producing goods and
services consumed by the government.

For example, the average ratio of physical

capital to output in both sectors may be relatively low particularl y if a high
weight is given to constructio n in the capital goods sector.
Under these assmnptions , equations (1.17) and (1.18) may be re-written as
k = g * (k, e, cr, y)

e = t * (k, e, cr, y)

Given that the system has a unique solution, these relationship s may be used
to detennine e and y in terms of k and cr.

The function determining GDP per

laborer may be expressed as
(1. 23)

y = f(k, cr)

It can be shown that, under certain conditions, the derivatives of this function
have the following properties

f

<

crcr -

0

For any given value of k we must also require that (1. 23) is maximized by

ae
A problem may arise in the case when ( 30 ) < o where
the derivative is evaluated for values of cr greater than the optimum. If e

a non-negativ e value of cr.

approaches unity before cr reaches zero, we would expect this derivative to
Under these conditions, the (w) ratio will approach infinity.
r
If, however, the system is far from full employment as cr approaches zero, a
1
negative value of cr may maximize (1.23) for a given value of k.
change sign.

1

A theoretical argument may be made that both o and k should enter the labor
supply function as well as w. This function would then be written as
e = e* (k, cr, w)
The avoidance of a corner solution would require e* to be sufficientl y large as
a > o
o, approaches zero such that
Limita -+ o (ae)
acr l'.k = o
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The Dynamics
The capital accumulatio n equation of the individual household takes the form
(1.24)

Denote taxes net of subsidies levied on the j-th household by NTj.

Now as

(1.25)

we have
(1.26)

One possible tax function is
(1.27)

which can be written as

. r .

(1.28)
II

The coefficient a

a

1

0

determines the revenue impact of the tax and the coefficient

determines the re-distribu tive effect of the tax.

into (1.26) yields
(1.29)

11

II

kj = - a

0

+ r {kj - ae - a
r
- (a

1

+

n

+

Substitutin g (1.28)

1

(kj - k)}

o) kj

Denote GDP by Y and aggregate capital stock by K.

As

(1.30)

we have

(1.31)

II

.j
k = - a

a

0

II

0
+ fk (k, cr) {kj - fk - al (kj - k)}

-

fo 1 + n + o) kj
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whence using
(1. 32)

(1.33)

and

(1.34)

j
d
j
a• ,:t:,, -1 E { (k - k) • dt (k - k) }
o

we have
(1.35)

k

=-

a

o

+ fk

(k

'

a) [ k - a]
o

(1. 36)

We define the state variab le
1 - a

I;

1

by the equati on

=

r;

The contro l variab les are given by the relatio nship s
(1.37)
(1.38)

=

I';

a

0

u

2

= u1 =

II

a

0

fk (k, cr)

Note
the
Note that u 1 is only a pseud o-cont rol variab le. In fact, it is
which the
interc ept of the net tax functi on (i.e., the expect ed net tax)
1
govern ment contro ls, not its capita liz~d value.
II

s it influe nces
It is assumed that the govern ment contro ls a 0 direct ly, wherea
for the fact
only the change in the re-dis tribut ion coeffi cient a 1 • This allows
varyin g the govem 
that the govern ment regula tes the level of gross invest ment by
public capita l
that
ption
11
ment sa'Jing s rate as well as net revenu e. On the assum
cient a 0 , equal to a 0 net of govern format ion benef its everyo ne equall y, a coeffi
11
ment invest ment, may be substi tuted for a •
1

0

-13The complete dynamics are then
(1. 39)
(1.40)

(1.41)

The Criterion Function
Denote consumption (public and private) per laborer by c.
Instantaneous welfare,U; is given by the function
(1.42)
where
(1.43)

The inclusion of per capita consumption in (1.42) is certainly conventional.
However, the same thing may not be said about the inclusion of u 1 and a •
.Arrow and Kurz ( 3] adduce a number of reasons why the ratio of government
capital to labor should be included in the welfare function in addition to con
sumption per laborer.

One of the most important of these is the effect of

external economies arising from public capital which is not allowed for in the
production-demand relationship.

In general, it is clear that the benefits of

government expena.i ture are not correctly valued in the national accounts; the
specific direction of bias is uncertain.
The usual assumption about the savings impact of redistribution is not
valid in the context of our model unless the benefits of government expenditure
are understated.

This assumption implies that a more even distribution of capital

and income increases the social cost of saving.

To reach this conclusion one

must assume that the ca~italized value of current government expenditure has
a positive effect on welfare which goes beyond its contribution to total consumption, (i.e., U

UJ_

>

0).

otherwise, the government cculd

compensate

-14-

for whatever decrease in private savings resulted from an equalization of
capital holdings at no social cost.

This would be accomplished simply by

reducing current government expenditures.
The inclusion of cr in the welfare function is highly debatable.

It may

not be feasible to determine the effect of changes in the distribution of
Difficulties arising from interpersonal comparisons

income on social welfare.

of utility and the use of voting are outlined by Arrow in (2].
The criterion function itself may be written as

·T

.r

(1.44)

e

-yt U (c, u , cr) dt
1

1
where y is the rate of social discount and Tis the planning horizon.

Thus

the paths of optimal capital accmnulation and distribution are given by the
solution(s) of the following optimal control problem:
'f
-yt
(
U (c, u , cr) dt
. e
Max
(1. 45)
1

Jo

where
(1.46)

(1.47)

(1.48)

lThe planning horizon, T, is assumed to be sufficiently large so that in
the discussions of equilibrium solutions, the finiteness of '1' has little effect.

-15and the constra ints
(1.49)

k

(1.50)

o ..'.:. u 1 ..'.:.

~

o, o

~

s

o,

-

a

0

>

o

+ {fk(k, cr)

- a } k

1

·fk(k, cr)
(1.51)

A..'.:. u 2 ..'.:. B
A < o ,

with

B >

0

The upper bound on u 1 z reflects the fact the gross investm ent per laborer
cannot be less than zero. The constra ints on u 2 indicate that it is impossi ble
to change the progres siveness of the tax instanta neously .

As

we shall show in

the next section , these constra ints are not germane to the rest of our discussi on.
II.

Equilibr ium Growth Paths
We shall conside r two cases.

The first is based on the assumpt ion that

the partial derivati ves of U with respect of u1 z and cr are zero. The second
concerns a more general situatio n in which U is a function of both u 1 and cr
explici tly.
The optimal control problem referred to in the previous section is linear
in the controls u 1 and u 2 ; thus the optimal policies will be of the "bang
singular -bang" type [5, pp. 261-65], i.e., the controls will move between their
boundary values and an interior value(s) correspo nding to the singula r arc(s).
From the usual definiti on of equilibr ium growth [1], we can see that the
equilibr ium solution s, if any, will be along the singula r arcs; the constra ints
(1.49) and (1.50) are thus of no conseque nce as long as the equilibr ium value

-16of the capital intensity can be attained without u

= o,

singular arc, when Hu

1

going to zero.

On the

the necessary conditions for optimality are derived

from a Hamiltonian of the form
(2 .1)

Thus we have
=

(2 .2)

= U

0

C

(2 .3)

and
(2 .4)

(2.5)

-"

0

= uC

{fa - fka (k - ul)}

-

"a {n + o + y + a.1 -

+

"k fkcr (k - ul)

f z; - f ad
k
kcr

and
(2 .6)

-

"

i:;

= - Y" z; +

f k ...a A a

In addition, we have the dynamics which are given by equations (1.46), (1.47)
and (1.48).

In equilibrium, k

1'

= 0 = a = i:; = "k=

"a=

,

"i:;

,',/

This gives
(2. 7)

ul

=k

-

1 + n + o)k +

(a.

fk (k, 0)

a

0

-17= o

(2.8)

u

(2.9)

r; =n+o+a .1

2

fk (k,

a)

Also,
(2.10)

" k = UC

(2.11)

"r;

=

0

Then from
(2 .12)

We have, assuming, , fk (k, a)
(2 .13)

" cr

i o
=

o

The two remaining variables are k, cr.

These can be obtained from (2.4)

and (2.5), giving
(2.14)

(2.15)

f

cr

(k, a) = o

In equation (2.14), we have the familiar modified golden rule condition .
The second signifies that the derivativ e of the productio n demand relations hip
with respect to a is zero.
In order for a modified golden rule equilibriu m to exist at the same time
as the constrain ts on u 1 and~
(2.16)
must hold.

are satisfied , the condition

-18-

This implies that both u1 is greater than zero and that~ is less than 1.
If this condition is not met, the steady-state optimum can be attained only
if "forced savings" (i.e., a negative u1 ) and/or positive net foreign capital
inflow are present. (Inclusion of the latter effect would cause a 0 to be
smaller.)

1

It can be seen that, in this case~ the equilibria are unique, provided
that fk(k, a) is concave ink and a •
so as to include the effects of u

1

However, if the function U(c) is altered

and cr , i.e.,

(2 .17)
the following changes occur.
Equation (2.2) becomes

{2.2)'
and (2.5) becomes

(2.5)'

+ ucr

The equilibrium conditions are now
(2. 7)

'

(2. 8)

'

1Recall the regularity condition that for any given value of K the value of
a which maximizes f{k,cr) is non-negative. This condition implies that
f {k, cr) ='oat cr > o.
a

-19-

(2.9) '

l;;

=

(2.10) '

(2 .11) '

(2.13)

'
I

(2.14)

"- 0

= 0

o+ y+

fk (k, o) = n +

u

ul

uC

(n +
{

o + y + a.1 - (n +

fk (k, cr)

cS)

2
fk(k,cr)

.

k • fkk - 1}

(2 .15) '

.

u
f

O'

{ (n + cS + a. ) k - a }
(k, cr)
f
1
0 }
{ kcr
f2 (k, cr)

ul

(k, o) = -

uC

- uua

:'Z:'r-

k

C

Clearly, more than one combination of k and cr may satisfy these conditions.

Aside from the possibility of multiple turnpikes, these conditions differ
from the ones obtained earlier in other respects.
the modified golden rule condition never holds.

From (2.10), observe that
Since

fkk

<

o, in equilibrium

the inequality

fk (k, cr)

>

must be satisfied provided that U
ul

n

+ o+ y
>

o.

Again in contrast to the previous

results, the partial derivative of the production demand relationship with respect
to cr need not equal zero along the turnpike.
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This is true simply because the effect of a change in o on welfare goes
i

beyond its effect on consumpti on per laborer.

Condition (2.15)

states that

the increase (decrease ) in welfare due to an increase (decrease ) in consumpti on
per laborer,

f

0

, must equal the sum of the two other welfare

(k, o) • UC

effects resulting from a change in o.

The first is the partial derivativ e of

the welfare with respect too multiplie d by -1.

The second is the change in

welfare stemming from the change in the level of u 1 necessary to maintain the
equilibriu m capital intensity ; this value is given by the term
{

fk

0

(k, o) [(n + o + a 1 ) k - a]
0

}

(k, o)

A relevant example is the case where

f

0

< o.

Here the social value of the rise

in consumpti on per laborer due to a decline in o must equal the social value of
the loss in capitaliz ed governmen t expenditu res net of the direct welfare gain.
Although the equilibri un value of Ua does affect cr, it has no effect on t
Thus, the coefficie nts of the
or u 1 since fk (k, cr) is independe nt of U0
net tax equation may be determine d in the case of the long-run optimal trajector y
without knowing effect of changes in o on social welfare.
III.

Conclusio n
The standard deviation of the distribut ion of disposabl e income per laborer

(oy)' in a steady-st ate equilibriu m is a linear function of cr.

For, from (1.25)

we see that the total disposabl e income (which is the sum of income from capital
y , and wage income w) is given by

0

Total disposabl e income= r . k + w - Expected net tax.

-21Then, noting the fact that wage income w, is assumed to be uniformly distribut ed,
we see that

Then from (2.9)
cry= (n + o

+ a 1) . a

The optimal trajector y fork, a, and ay depends on where the initial values
for these two variables lie relative to the steady-st ate optimum values given
V

1

and (2. 15) •

by (2 .14)

In the case where one or more turnpikes exist and the

initial condition for a lies below all the steady-st ate optimum values, it will

be optimal to increase capital dispersio n initially . If the terminal condition
on

cr requires that it lie below the turnpike values, then the optimal path

for cr will arch toward the turnpike value and then eventuall y arch down to
the terminal value.

Assuming that the initial and terminal values for o satisfy

two different steady-st ate equilibriu m condition s, ay will follow a similar
pattern.

This trajector y is comparabl e to that observed historica lly by

Kuznets [12].
The view that income equalizat ion and economic growth are consisten t objective s
holds true when, given that U(J is zero everywher e, welfare may be maximized by
increasin g k and simultane ously lowering a.

Under these circumsta nces the incre-

ment in welfare due to the expansion ary effect which a decline in dispersio n
has on GDP

per laborer must outweigh the social cost of the decline in capitaliz ed

governmen t expenditu res necessary to keep k constant.

Since the initial value

of k is below the optimum, we are assured that this condition will not be met
by a downward adjustmen t in both k and a which could lead to a decrease in GPP
per laborer.

However, in many cases, finding the optimal trajector y for cr will not

be so simple.

is non-zero, multiple
In this paper we have indicated that when U
ul

-22turnpikes may exist; thus, the initial value of a will depend upon a variety
of factors such as the proximity of the initial value to a given steady-state
level, the stability of the various solutions and the initial condition on k.
One interesting situation that may arise in the multiple-turnpi ke case
appears to have a direct bearing on the effect of postponing income redistribution
in developing countries.

Consider the case when

uu1 #

0

and the initial

values of k and a lie between two turnpikes; along one k and a are larger than
along the other.

There is evidence to suggest that in developing countries

income becomes more unevenly distributed as per capita consumption and the capital
intensity rises.

Thus by not deviating from the normal pattern of increasing

capital accumulation at the expense of further dispersion, policy makers may

reach a stage beyond which income equalization may no longer be optimal.

In

other words, postponing re-distribution may lead the society to a set of initial
conditions from which it is optimal to arch towards the turnpike with the higher
value of a, whereas a trajectory with a lower value of income dispersion may
have been possible in the past.
One final point that should be made is that the fonn of the welfare function
may affect the equilibrium values of a without affecting the optimal trajectory
oft (which is equal to one minus the re-distribution coefficient, a 1).

Thus

when the initial value of the re-distribution coefficient lies below the relevant
turnpike, it is optimal to set a1 at its upper bound until the turnpike is
reached. and conversely for the case when the initial value lies above. Moreover,
the turnpike value of a 1 is independent of the form of U0 •
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